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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, sixty-seven-year-old Shepherd Reale pleaded 
guilty to felony sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age. The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed. The district court 
also ordered Mr. Reale to pay the parents of the victim $4355.68 in restitution. 
On appeal, Mr. Reale asserts that substantial evidence did not support the award 
of $3315.68 in restitution for lost wages of the mother of the victim, because the award 
was for time the mother spent resting instead of going to work. Whether a district court 
may award "lost wages" restitution for the time a victim spent resting of going to 
work 
of first impression. Mr. Reale also asserts that the district court abused its discretion 
when it imposed his sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Eight-year-old M.S. reported that Mr. Reale had rubbed her chest and vaginal 
area through her clothing while she was at his house. (Conf. Exs., p.37.)1 M.S. also 
stated that Mr. Reale had kissed her mouth, bare neck, bare chest, and bare stomach, 
and that she had seen his "privates." (Conf. Exs., p.37.) When Officer Edward Gates of 
the Jerome Police Department contacted Mr. Reale, he gave the officer full access to 
his medical records from the VA Medical Center in Boise. (Conf. Exs., p.37.) He did 
not want to tell Officer Gates anything for fear of wording it incorrectly. (Conf. Exs., 
p.37.) The VA medical records indicated that Mr. Reale voluntarily admitted himself 
1 All citations to the Confidential Exhibits refer to the 89-page PDF electronic document. 
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girl. . . " , p.37 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Reale had committed the crime 
of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age, felony, in violation of Idaho 
Code§ 18-1508. (R., pp.9-10.) The State later filed an Amended Criminal Complaint 
alleging Mr. Reale had committed one count of felony lewd conduct with a minor under 
sixteen years of age, and one count of felony sexual abuse of a child under sixteen 
years of age. (R., pp.47-48.) After Mr. Reale waived a preliminary hearing, the 
magistrate bound him over to the district court. (R., pp.57, 59-60.) The State then filed 
an Information charging Mr. Reale with one count of lewd conduct and one count of 
sexual abuse. (R., pp.63-64.) Mr. 
charges. (R., p.70.) 
initially 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Reale subsequently agreed to plead guilty to 
the sexual abuse count, and the State agreed to dismiss the lewd conduct count. 
(R., p.92.) The district court accepted Mr. Reale's guilty plea. (R., p.93.) 
The State then filed a Restitution Request, asking for an award of $391.35 to the 
Idaho Industrial Commission's Crime Victim's Compensation Program (CVCP). 
(R., pp.96-99.) Later, the State filed an Amended Restitution Request, asking for an 
award of $698.65 to the CVCP and an award of $10,260.00 to Kathryn Shepard and 
Carter Shepard, the parents of M.S. (R., pp.100-04.) The total requested restitution of 
$10,958.65 broke down as follows: 
CVCP 
The Shepards 
CARES Examination 
St. Luke's Clinic Examination 
Total 
Kathryn Shepard Lost Wages 
Carter Shepard Lost Wages 
2 
$307.50 
$391.35 
$698.65 
$3220.00 
$1000.00 
Mileage: 80 Miles At $0.50 
Tuition For Failed 
(See R., p.100.) 
ile $40.00 
$6000.00 
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the district court impose 
a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. (Tr., p.40, Ls.17-23.) 
Mr. Reale recommended that the district court place him on probation. (Tr., p.46, L.24 -
p.48, L.15.) The district court then imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with 
three years fixed. (R., pp.110, 112-18.) Mr. Reale filed a Notice of Appeal timely from 
the district court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.124-26.) 
At the subsequent restitution hearing, the based upon the testimony of the 
Shepards, requested a modified total restitution award of $11,862.68. (Tr., p.106, 
Ls.16-19.) The increase came from the State's request for $3315.68 instead of 
$3220.00 for Ms. Shepard's lost wages, $1200.00 for private school tuition, and $167.00 
for child care expenses. (See Tr., p.106, L.20 - p.107, L.6; State's Ex. 1.) 
Ms. Shepard's requested lost wages were from when she missed part or all of 
her 12-hour shifts as a night charge nurse on the nights before scheduled counseling 
sessions or court proceedings. (See Tr., p.72, L.13 - p.86, L.15; State's Ex. 1, p.1.) 
She reported that she missed a total of 92 hours of work, at an hourly rate of $36.04, for 
a total of $3315.68. (State's Ex. 1, p.1.) Ms. Shepard represented that she missed part 
or all of her shifts because she wanted to be "rested" for the court proceedings. 
(Tr., p.83, Ls.19-24.) Mr. Reale asserted, with respect to those requested lost wages, 
that it was not foreseeable "that someone would miss a 12-hour shift the night before a 
court hearing in order to be there for that hearing in the morning." (Tr., p.110, Ls.18-
21.) 
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the restitution hearing, the district its 
Restitution. (R., pp.140-47.) The district court Ms. Shepard 15.68 for 
lost wages, and awarded Mr. Shepard $1000.00 for lost income. (R., p.144.) The 
district court also awarded the Shepards $40.00 for mileage expenses for driving M.S. 
to her CARES interview and physical examination. (R., p.144.) 
However, the district court denied the Shepards' request for $1200.00 for M.S.'s 
private school tuition, because they enrolled M.S. in a private school to prevent future 
harm and the tuition expenses were thus not recoverable as restitution. (R., p.145.) 
The district court also denied Mr. Shepard's request for $6000.00 for repayment of his 
student loans, because there was insufficient evidence to establish a causal nexus 
between Mr. Reale's conduct and the repayment of the loans, which would have to be 
repaid in any event. (R., p.145.) 
In the Judgment/Order of Restitution, the district court awarded CVCP a total of 
$698.65 and the Shepards a total of $4355.68. (R., pp.148-150.) 
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1. 
ISSUES 
Did substantial evidence support the restitution award of 
Ms. Shepard for lost wages? 
15.68 to 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
fifteen years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Reale following his plea of guilty to 
sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Substantial Evidence Did Not Support The Restitution Award Of $3315.68 To 
Ms. Shepard For Lost Wages 
A Introduction 
Mr. Reale asserts that substantial evidence did not support the restitution award 
of $3315.68 to Ms. Shepard for lost wages, because the award was for time she spent 
resting instead of going to work. Alternatively, even if Ms. Shepard's time spent resting 
instead of going to work is awardable as restitution for lost wages, substantial evidence 
did not support the full award of $33·15.68. 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
A district court has discretion over the decision whether, and in what amount, to 
award restitution, guided by the factors set forth in l.C. § 19-4304(7). State v. Corbus, 
150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011 ). 'The issue of causation in restitution cases is a question of 
fact to be decided by the trial court." Id. "The district court's factual findings with regard 
to restitution will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence." 
State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion." Id. 
Idaho Code § 19-5304 provides that: "Unless the court determines that an order 
of restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable, it shall order a defendant found 
guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to 
the victim." I.C. § 19-5304(2). "Restitution shall be ordered for any economic loss 
which the victim actually suffers." Id. The definition of "economic loss" includes "lost 
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as well as "direct or " I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a). 
loss shall be based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the 
court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim or presentence investigator." I.C. § 19-
5304(6). 
"[l]n order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a causal connection 
between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries suffered by 
the victim." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602. This is because Section 19-5304 permits 
restitution for "any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim." I.C. § 19-
5304(2). Further, Section 19-5304 defines "victim" as a "directly injured victim which 
means a person or entity, who economic loss or injury as the result of the 
defendant's criminal conduct and shall also include the immediate family of a 
minor .... " I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i) (emphasis added). 
For purposes of criminal restitution, "causation consists of actual cause and true 
proximate cause." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602 (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 
374 (2009)). "Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event 
produced a particular consequence." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]rue 
proximate cause deals with whether it was reasonably foreseeable that such harm 
would flow from the negligent conduct." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "In 
analyzing proximate cause, [the reviewing Court] must determine whether the injury and 
manner of occurrence are so highly unusual that a reasonable person, making an 
inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have 
reasonably expect the injury to occur." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"An intervening, superseding cause," which is "an independent act or force that 
breaks the causal chain between the defendant's culpable act and the victim's injury," 
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generally "replaces the defendant's as the proximate cause of the victim's injury." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]o relieve a defendant of criminal liability, an 
intervening cause must be an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence." Id. at 602-
03. "The defendant remains criminally liable if either the possible consequence might 
reasonably have been contemplated or the defendant should have foreseen the 
possibility of harm of the kind that could result from his act." Id. at 603 {internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
C. 
lost 
Substantial Evidence Did Not Support The Award Of $3315.68 For Lost Wages 
To Ms. Shepard, Because The Award \/Vas For Time She Spent Resting Instead 
Of Going To Work 
Substantial evidence does not support the district court's award of $3315.68 for 
to Ms. Shepard, because the award was for time she spent resting instead of 
going to work. As discussed above, Ms. Shepard represented that she missed part or 
all of her shifts because she wanted to be "rested" for the court proceedings. (Tr., p.83, 
Ls.19-24.) The district court justified the award for lost wages on the basis that 
Ms. Shepard "took off time for court so that she could be prepared for court if her 
participation in the proceedings may be required. This is understandable given the fact 
that she works evenings and would have little rest after her work day before attending 
court." (R., p.143.) The district court also stated that, "It is not unreasonable for her to 
take off time to be prepared for court. . . . [Ms. Shepard] took her time off in 4 hour 
blocks and did her best to find coverage for her blocks of time to avoid taking off more 
time than necessary to be prepared and attentive in court." (R., p.143.) 
Whether a district court may award "lost wages" restitution for time a victim spent 
resting instead of going to work is a question of first impression. Mr. Reale asserts that 
Section 19-5304 does not contemplate awarding victims lost wages for taking time off 
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work to rested or prepared attending court proceed Shepard, by 
spending time resting instead of going to work, did not suffer an economic 
analogous to lost wages. Her choice to spend time resting instead of going to work was 
an intervening, superseding cause that severed the causal link between Mr. Reale's 
criminal conduct and Ms. Shepard's loss of wages. Thus, substantial evidence does not 
support the district court's award of $3315.68 for lost wages to Ms. Shepard. 
A district court may award victims restitution for time spent attending court 
proceedings (including travel time) instead of going to work. Thus, Ms. Shepard would 
be "entitled to lost wages for time off that was reasonable to enable [her] to attend court 
proceedings, including travel time." State v. Houser, 155 Idaho 521, :314 P.3d 203, 
211 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a 
victim company that sent its vice president to a restitution hearing suffered economic 
loss as contemplated by I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a), because "the victim in this case lost the 
full value of the time its vice president spent attending court proceedings"); State v. 
Russell, 126 Idaho 38, 39 (Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam) (holding that "the time spent in 
court by a self-employed victim during which that person could otherwise be pursuing 
his vocation, but who has been called to testify about the losses caused to him through 
criminal conduct of the defendant, has suffered an economic loss within the meaning of 
I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a)"). 
Victims may request restitution for time spent attending court proceedings 
instead of going to work because the loss suffered by victims through court attendance 
is closely analogous to lost wages. As explained above, the definition of "economic 
loss" includes "lost wages." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a). By analogy to lost wages, the Russell 
Court concluded "that the time spent in court by a self-employed victim during which 
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that person could otherwise be pursuing his vocation, but who has been to testify 
about the losses caused to him through criminal conduct of defendant, suffered 
an economic loss" for purposes of criminal restitution. Russell, 126 Idaho at 39 
(emphasis added). 
In view of Russell, the Olpin Court held that the victim company suffered 
economic loss because it "lost the full value of the time its vice president spent 
attending court proceedings." Olpin, 140 Idaho at 379. The victim company's 
employees "were diverted from their normal duties to ... court attendance tasks as a 
result of [the defendant's] offense." Id. 
Later, the Houser Court discussed lost wages restitution for court in 
terms of missing work to attend court. Houser, 1 Idaho at , 314 P.3d 210. 
While "a victim who attends court proceedings will necessarily miss work for longer than 
the duration of the proceeding in his or her case" because of the vagaries of court 
scheduling, "this uncertainty factor justifies presence at the courthouse only before a 
proceeding begins, not after it ends." Id. at_, 314 P.3d at 210 (emphasis added). 
Additionally, a victim's choice to miss work to attend court is foreseeable, not an 
intervening, superseding cause. The Houser Court held that the victim's "choice to 
attend most, if not all, of the proceedings was not an intervening, superseding cause 
that severed the causal link between [the defendant's] criminal behavior and [the 
victim's] loss of wages." Id. at_, 314 P.3d at 210. This was because it was "not 
unforeseeable" that a crime victim would want to attend and actually attend most or all 
court proceedings, the importance of a given proceeding may not be evident to a victim, 
and the importance of a proceeding to a victim may be different than the importance of 
a proceeding to the disposition of a case. Id. at , 314 P.3d at 210. 
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In contrast to the victims in Houser, Olpin, and Russell, Shepard did not 
request restitution for time spent attending court proceedings instead of going to work. 
The district court recognized that "the court hearings in [Mr. Reale's] case were 
generally held between 9:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. and that these hearings were not held 
during [Ms. Shepard's] hours of work (7:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m.)." (R., p.143.) She "took 
off time for court so that she could be prepared for court if her participation in the 
proceedings may be required." (R., p.143) Thus, Ms. Shepard requested restitution for 
time spent resting instead of going to work, not time spent actually attending 
court proceedings. 
Shepard, by spending time resting instead of going to did not suffer an 
economic loss analogous to lost wages. Unlike the victims in Houser, Olpin, and 
Russell, Ms. Shepard did not miss work to attend court proceedings scheduled at the 
same time as work. Thus, Ms. Shepard did not spend any time in court when she could 
otherwise have been "pursuing her vocation." Cf. Russell, 126 Idaho at 39. Nor was 
Ms. Shepard "diverted from [her] normal duties" to attend court. Cf. Olpin, 140 Idaho at 
379. She did not "miss work" because of her "presence at the court." Cf. Houser, 155 
Idaho at_, 314 P.3d at 210. 
Further, Ms. Shepard's choice to spend time resting instead of going to work was 
an intervening, superseding cause that severed the causal link between Mr. Reale's 
criminal conduct and Ms. Shepard's loss of wages. It was not reasonably foreseeable 
that, as a result of Mr. Reale's criminal conduct, Ms. Shepard would miss work during 
hours where no court proceedings took place. See Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602-03. 
Rather, it is "unforeseeable and extraordinary" that a victim like Ms. Shepard, in order to 
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,;u,AJ\Aings, would to miss work during hours where no court 
proceedings took place. See id. at 602-03. 
A reasonable person in Mr. Reale's position, "making an inventory of the 
possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably 
expected" Ms. Shepard to miss partial or entire shifts at work to attend court 
proceedings that occurred not during, but after those shifts. Houser, 155 Idaho at_, 
314 P.3d at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Corbus, 150 Idaho at 604-
05 (holding that a reasonable person in the defendant's position of driving dangerously 
night would have reasonably foreseen that a passenger might have been injured after 
jumping from the vehicle to escape the dangerous situation). Thus, her choice to spend 
time resting instead of going to work was an intervening, superseding cause that 
severed the causal link between Mr. Reale's criminal conduct and Ms. Shepard's loss of 
wages. Cf. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 604-05; Houser, 155 Idaho at 314 P.3d at 210. 
In sum, Section 19-5304 does not contemplate awarding victims lost wages for 
time spent resting before attending court proceedings. Ms. Shepard, by spending time 
resting instead of going to work, did not suffer an economic loss analogous to lost 
wages. Her choice to spend time resting instead of going to work was an intervening, 
superseding cause that severed the causal link between Mr. Reale's criminal conduct 
and Ms. Shepard's loss of wages. Thus, substantial evidence does not support the 
district court's restitution award of $3315.68 to Ms. Shepard for lost wages, because the 
award was for time she spent resting instead of going to work. The district court's 
restitution award of $3315.68 for Ms. Shepard's lost wages should be vacated and the 
matter remanded for the entry of a new restitution order reducing the amount of 
restitution awarded to the Shepards by $3315.68. 
12 
D. Even If Ms. Shepard's Time Spent Resting Instead Of Going To Work . Is 
Awardable As Restitution For Lost Wages, Substantial Evidence Did !'Jot Support 
The Full Award Of $3315.68 
Alternatively, even if Ms. Shepard's time spent resting instead of going to work is 
awardable as restitution for lost wages because she suffered economic loss analogous 
to lost wages and her choice to rest before attending court proceedings was 
foreseeable as opposed to an intervening, superseding cause, substantial evidence did 
not support the full award of $3315.68. Ms. Shepard requested restitution for five entire 
12-hour shifts off work, as well as for several partial shifts off work. (State's Ex. 1, p.1.) 
However, it was not reasonably necessary for her to take entire 12-hour shifts off work 
or 
before court proceedings. 
who decided not to cover 
the voluntary choices of the third party 
entire 12-hour shifts constituted an 
intervening, superseding cause that precludes a finding that Mr. Reale's criminal 
conduct was the proximate cause of Ms. Shepard's economic loss for the entire shifts. 
"[l]n the absence of evidence of a justification, a court may not presume that loss 
of an entire work day is justified for every attendance at a hearing regardless of its 
duration or time of day." Houser, 155 Idaho at_, 214 P.3d at 211. "For example, an 
individual wishing to attend a hearing that is scheduled for 9 a.m., together with 
numerous other hearings, may have to wait from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. before his or her 
case is taken up by the court; but that would not necessarily justify taking the remainder 
of the day off work if the hearing was concluded by noon." Id. at_, 214 P.3d at 210. 
The record in Houser contained no evidence that the victim's employer did not 
allow the victim to take partial days off work to attend court proceedings, which 
undermined the district court's finding that uncertainty about hearing times caused the 
victim to take entire days off work. Id. at , 314 P.3d at 211. Because "[t]he State did 
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what portion of [the victim's] time was reasonably necessary for his 
attendance at the court proceedings and what portion, if any was caused by his 
voluntary choice not to work for the remainder of the day," the Court held that "the 
district court's award of restitution for entire days off work is not supported by 
substantial evidence and must be vacated." Id. at 314 P.3d at 211. 
Similarly, the evidence here indicates that Ms. Shepard could have taken, and 
did take in some instances, partial shifts off work to be "rested" for the court 
proceedings she attended. For example, she took four hours each off her shifts before 
a CARES examination and three court proceedings. (State's 1, p.1.) Additionally, 
Ms. Shepard took eight hours off work before, respectively, a CARES interview and one 
court proceeding. (State's 1, p.1.) Ms. Shepard's taking partial shifts off work 
suggests that it was not "reasonably necessary" for her to take entire 12-hour shifts off 
work to be rested "for [her] attendance at the court proceedings." See Houser, 155 
Idaho at_, 314 P.3d at 211. In fact, Ms. Shepard appeared to prefer to not take 
entire 12-hour shifts off work. { See Tr., p. 73, Ls.2-5.) 
Ms. Shepard testified that the reason she missed her entire 12-hour shifts before 
five court proceedings {see State's Ex. 1, p.1 ), was that she was unable to find anyone 
to cover those shifts. (See Tr., p.73, Ls.2-5; p.82, Ls.11-19, p.83, Ls.16-18.) According 
to Ms. Shepard, it was "kind of hard" to "find people to switch schedules with me." 
(Tr., p.73, Ls.2-5.) The voluntary choices of the third party or parties who decided not to 
switch schedules and cover Ms. Shepard's shifts constituted an intervening, 
superseding cause that precludes a finding that Mr. Reale's criminal conduct was the 
proximate cause of Ms. Shepard's economic loss for those entire 12-hour shifts. See 
Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602-03; Houser, 155 Idaho at , 314 P .3d at 211. It was not 
14 
reasonably that, a result of Mr. Reale's criminal conduct, those third 
parties would decline to cover Ms. Shepard's shifts. Cf. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 604-05; 
Houser, 155 Idaho at_, 314 P.3d at 211. Thus, even if it were reasonably necessary 
for Ms. Shepard to take partial shifts off work to attend court proceedings that occurred 
after those shifts, the award of restitution for the entire 12-hour shifts off work was not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
In short, even if Ms. Shepard's time spent resting instead of going to work is 
awardable as restitution for lost wages, substantial evidence did not support the full 
award of $3315.68. It was not reasonably necessary for her to take entire 12-hour shifts 
voluntary of the 
third party or parties who decided not to cover those shifts constituted an intervening, 
superseding cause that precludes finding that Mr. Reale's criminal conduct was the 
proximate cause of Ms. Shepard's economic loss for those entire 12-hour shifts. Thus, 
the district court's restitution award of $3315.68 for Ms. Shepard's lost wages should be 
vacated and the matter remanded for a new determination of the amount of 
Ms. Shepard's lost wages proximately caused by Mr. Reale's criminal conduct. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen 
Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Reale Following His Plea Of Guilty To Sexual 
Abuse Of A Child Under Sixteen Years Of Age 
Mr. Reale asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his 
sentence because his unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed, is 
excessive considering any view of the facts. The district court should have instead 
placed Mr. Reale on probation as he recommended, or imposed a lesser sentence. 
15 
Where a defendant contends the sentencing 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review the record 
giving "due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 {2002). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293,294 (1997) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Mr. Reale does not allege that his sentence exceeds the 
statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Reale 
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the was 
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal 
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. Id. An appellate court, "[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence ... 
consider[s] the defendant's entire sentence." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 
(2007). The reviewing court will "presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be 
the defendant's probable term of confinement." Id. 
Mr. Reale submits that, because the district court did not give adequate 
consideration to mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Specifically, the district court did not 
adequately consider Mr. Reale's low risk to reoffend. Mr. Reale's Static-99R actuarial 
risk assessment, administered during his psychosexual evaluation conducted by 
Dr. Linda Hatzenbuehler, resulted in a total score of -2, "which places him in the low risk 
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for being charged or convicted of offense solely on 
Static-99R." (Conf. , pp.10, 17.) 
The psychosexual evaluation also involved the Stable-2007 and Risk for Sexual 
Violence Protocol (RSVP) instruments, which "assess dynamic (changeable) aspects of 
an individual's life that have been found to be related to or prevent sex offense 
recidivism." (Conf. Exs., p.20.) "Mr. Reale scored in the Moderate range on the Stable-
2007. Combining his Static-99R score (Low) with his Stable-2007 score results in a 
combined rating of Low risk to reoffend." (Conf. Exs., p.21 (emphasis in original).) The 
RSVP, which does not yield a risk score or probability of reoffending, showed that, while 
Mr. Reale had the treatment issue of being a victim of sexual abuse himself and having 
some deviate sexual interests, also had protective factors or assets including "his lack 
of a significant criminal history, his long term intimate relationship and the fact that he is 
not a substance abuser nor does he currently meet criteria for a serious mental illness." 
(Conf. Exs., pp.25-26.) 
In sum, the psychosexual evaluation concluded that "Mr. Reale's risk level falls 
within the Low range for re-offense based upon static factors. Adding dynamic factors, 
his risk level resulted in his risk range remaining in the low risk range for re-offense." 
(Conf. Exs., p.26.) Although his risk "is highest for young females known to him" and 
his "contact with young children should be supervised," Mr. Reale "does not appear to 
be a risk to the community at large." (Conf. Exs., p.26.) 
While the district court noted "from the static and other dynamic factors that 
Dr. Hatzenbuehler relied upon in her testing that statistically [Mr. Reale] would be a low 
risk to reoffend," the district court also noted that "those dynamic factors and those 
static factors upon which those actuarial measures are made do not consider the level 
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risk when is acknowledgement that such similar behavior has occurred in the 
" (Tr., p.54, Ls.2-10.) However, the Stable-2007 assessment of dynamic factors 
actually considered Mr. Reale's "Deviant Sexual Preferences," including that "[h]e 
appears to have had more than one deviant victim (under the age of 14)." (Conf. Exs., 
p.12.) The psychosexual evaluation also mentioned several past episodes of reported 
"similar behavior" in its account of Mr. Reale's sexual history. (See Conf. Exs., pp.14-
15.) Thus, the psychosexual evaluation, when it assessed Mr. Reale's static and 
dynamic risk factors, considered his reported prior sexual behavior. Mr. Reale was still 
found to be a low risk to reoffend. (Conf. Exs., p.26.) Adequate consideration of 
Mr. low risk to reoffend should have resulted in a sentence. 
Additionally, the district court did not give adequate consideration to Mr. Reale's 
own history of being a victim of sexual abuse. When Mr. Reale was four years old, his 
female babysitter molested him. (Conf. Exs., p.14.) She made him perform oral sex on 
her. (Conf. Exs., p.14.) Mr. Reale could not specifically recall how many times the 
molestations happened, but indicated he had flashbacks to the molestations during his 
sexual conduct with M.S. (Cont. Exs., p.14.) Mr. Reale's own history of being a victim 
of sexual abuse does not excuse his behavior, but it does help explain it. Adequate 
consideration of Mr. Reale's own history of being a victim of sexual abuse should have 
resulted in a lesser sentence. 
The district court also did not adequately consider Mr. Reale's physical health 
problems. Mr. Reale served in the United States Marine Corps from 1965 to 1969, and 
did one tour in Vietnam. (Conf. Exs., pp.13, 40-41.) While in Vietnam, he was exposed 
to Dioxin (Agent Orange). (Conf. Exs., p.41.) Mr. Reale was finally diagnosed with 
Dioxin poisoning in the early 1990s, and since then he has received 100% VA disability 
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, p.1 ) The Dioxin poisoning caused Mr. to 
diabetes, peripheral artery disease, and blindness. (Conf. , p.41.) Mr. Reale is 
legally blind. (Conf. Exs., p.41.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Reale's physical health 
problems should have resulted in a lesser sentence. 
Further, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Reale's grief over the 
illness and death of his wife. Mr. Reale married his wife, Dixie Reale, in 1967, and they 
had two children. (Conf. Exs., p.40.) Before the conduct underlying the instant offense 
occurred, Ms. Reale had been ill for over a year. (See Tr., p.51, Ls.8-9.) Mr. Reale 
struggled to get her medical attention, but "she was a very stubborn lady" and he would 
not argue with her. (Tr., p.51, Ls.9-13.) Mr. Reale told the district court, "It wasn't until 
she couldn't get up off the floor that she finally agreed that she had to go to the hospital 
to be checked." (Tr., p.51, Ls.14-16.) Unfortunately, Ms. Reale passed away from 
cancer about a month after Mr. Reale's arrest for the instant offense. (See Conf. Exs., 
p.40; R., pp.16-17.) 
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Reale's counsel related that Mr. Reale had "spent 
a very significant period of time in jail missing the last weeks of his wife's life, having not 
had a memorial service or funeral for his wife at this point." (Tr., p.48, Ls.22-25.) 
Mr. Reale told the district court, "I have yet to mourn my wife. I've been mourning her 
since she went to the hospital, and it's already, what, five or six months, seven months." 
(Tr., p.51, L.24 - p.52, L.3.) Even though the district court told Mr. Reale, "I'm aware of 
the stress that you were under with respect to your wife and the illness" (Tr., p.56, Ls.2-
4 ), adequate consideration of Mr. Reale's grief over the sickness and death of his wife 
should have resulted in a lesser sentence. 
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the district did not consider mitigating 
factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is ""'J~-.,~ considering any view of 
the facts. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed Mr. Reale's 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Reale respectfully requests that this Court vacate the 
district court's restitution award of $3315.68 for Ms. Shepard's lost wages and remand 
the matter for the entry of a new restitution order reducing the amount of restitution 
awarded to the Shepards by $3315.68. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this 
Court the district court's restitution award of $3315.68 for Ms. Shepard's lost 
wages and remand the matter for a new determination of the amount of Ms. Shepard's 
lost wages proximately caused by Mr. Reale's criminal conduct. 
Mr. Reale also respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that his case be remanded to 
the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 1st day of July, 2014. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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